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CHRISTIAN PERSONALISM AS A SOURCE OF THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS1
ABSTRACT
To mark the 70th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the author embarked on an attempt to analyze the 
theoretical and historical framework that contributed to the adoption 
of the document. The first part of the article discusses the development 
of the philosophy of personalism from Mounier to Maritain and analyzes 
Maritain’s views on human rights. In the second part of the article, the 
author shows the decisive influence of the personalists Charles Malik 
and Rene Cassin on the adoption of the document, which clearly bears 
the mark of the Christian personalistic discourse and notions.
Last December we celebrated exactly seventy years since the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights was adopted on December 10, 1948 by the United 
Nations General Assembly. Today human rights have grown into a kind of sec-
ular religion, and there are even those who claim that human rights should be 
a substitute for religion. They are understood predominantly in an individu-
alistic way, as a framework that protects privacy, the rights of individuals in 
relation to various collective bodies, and are increasingly associated with the 
so-called individual rights of the last generation involving LGB and especial-
ly transgender rights. This direction in the interpretation and understanding 
of human rights, which spread on the horizon of Roman-Kantian philosophy 
of autonomy in the mid-sixties, and started to dominate since, has little to do 
with the original context and philosophy in which, during the 1940s and es-
pecially after the Second World War discourse, the documents and practice of 
human rights were established. The philosophy and background of the recon-
struction and development of the human rights theory at that time was deep-
ly Christian, associated with the personalistic school of Christian philosophy.
Several important researchers, including probably the most important histo-
rian of the human rights phenomenon today, Yale professor Samuel Moyn, have 
recently reminded us of this original context and framework for understanding 
1  Abbreviated UNDHR.
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human rights.2 In the series of works followed here, Moyn notes that human 
rights at the time of the adoption of the UNDHR were not seen as part of a 
radical, revolutionary and republican tradition, but that they were more close-
ly related to the serious reconstruction of conservatism during the forties, and 
to personalism and Christian democracy. He also suggested that this reminder 
of their original context and meaning might be useful for their current reval-
uation and understanding.
In this article, we will first recall the complex relationship of Christian 
churches, and especially the Roman Catholic Church with the idea of human 
rights; we will then point out that during the thirties and forties, with the de-
velopment of the Christian philosophy of personalism, the idea of natural law 
and human dignity was also restored within the church, and will then discuss 
how this new philosophy spread through international institutions and fun-
damentally contributed to the creation and adoption of the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights seventy years ago.
*
In today’s Western world it would be difficult to find a Christian denomination 
in which the idea of  human rights has not been appropriated. But this was not 
always the case: the history of the relationship of individual denominations 
toward the idea of  individual human rights or inalienable human rights is very 
complex and controversial. As the Roman Catholic Church for a long time in 
the nineteenth century and for much of the first half of the twentieth rejected 
this idea, seeing it as originally associated with the Freemasonry movement, 
liberters and other enemies of Christianity and the Church, so a significant 
number of evangelists, for example, thought that this idea came from deism, 
and that therefore there was no place for it in the true Christian tradition 
(Traer 2001, second chapter). In other Protestant traditions, there was strong 
resistance to the idea of human rights because of the violation of the idea of 
agape, or love, as the basis of Christian relations between people. The idea of 
human rights as related to the notion of justice is rejected because it violates 
the principle of agape.
Contrary to the thinkers who seek to show that Christian churches have dif-
ficulty and are relatively late to integrate the idea of  human rights, Wolsterstorff 
(2011) insists that this complex relationship and partial hostility of Christianity 
2  After his important 2010 book Human Rights as the Last Utopia, Moyn developed 
ideas on the Christian, personalistic background of human rights in a series of articles 
and lectures, to synthesize the project in the extraordinary manifesto work Christian 
Human Rights (2015). Especially important is the Introduction in which he precisely 
presented his basic thesis. In addition to Moyn, Mary Ann Glendon should also be men-
tioned. See Glendon 2001. Mazower 2004 is significant because he also refuted the con-
temporary apocryphal image of the Declaration as an unhindered triumph of goodwill 
and liberal spirit. In his important study, he showed how much cynicism, trade-off, and 
controversial actions of the great Western powers were involved in this process.
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in the twentieth century was some kind of aberration, because the very idea of 
natural law as the basis for human rights derives from the Christian tradition. 
The Enlightenment did not invent human rights, he argues: it only took this 
concept over from the Christian tradition of the Middle Ages.
This is no doubt true, but this tradition has long been obscured and sup-
pressed within the Roman Catholic Church itself. The entire intellectual, so-
cial and political development in the interwar period prompted the general 
perception of human rights as individualism, atomism, liberal anarchism that 
ruled in the nineteenth century and because of which the European civilization 
collapsed into the abyss with the Great War. Therefore, everyone was trying 
to find a path leading away from this disadvantaged heritage. The Christian 
churches were part of this entire movement until the end of the 1930s when 
a very complex, spiraling movement began to restore the tradition of natural 
law, which only later led to the full affirmation of the idea of  human rights and 
its codification in a series of documents such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948), the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (1949) 
and the European Convention on Human Rights (1950).
The most important name throughout this process is Jacques Maritain, a 
great Roman Catholic philosopher, who was very influential during the forties 
and fifties, and whose academic and ideological development – from being a 
member of Action française, through emigration and support of De Gaulle’s re-
sistance movement, and influencing the writing of the UN Declaration of Hu-
man Rights – best illustrates the path of restoring and developing the concept 
of human rights. The author who in an extraordinary way has recently recon-
structed the Christian and personalist basis of the post-war human rights dis-
course, demonstrating that the modern left liberal secular discourse has fully 
usurped and covered the original meaning of human rights is the already men-
tioned Samuel Moyn, professor at Yale University, who also encouraged this 
research. Johannes Tavernian from the Catholic University of Leuven in Bel-
gium is also a prominent name in contemporary personalism research. From 
our region one should single out the recently defended doctoral dissertation 
of Ivan Čulo Influence of Personalism on Modern Legal Formulation of Human 
Rights.3 With the help of their works and the views of Maritain himself, we 
will now summarize briefly how, above all, the Roman Catholic Church and 
its intellectuals formed a personalistic and communitarian discourse on hu-
man rights in the period 1935–1950.
Wolsterstorff rightly draws attention to a series of relatively recent works 
– as many as four books that trace the Christian tradition of natural law from 
3  With Ivan Šestak and Vladimir Lončarević, Čulo also edited the very interesting 
and current proceedings  Odjeci filozofije personalizma (Echoes of the Philosophy of Per-
sonalism), based on the papers presented at the conference held in 2017 at the Faculty 
of Philosophy and Religious Sciences in Zagreb.
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the twentieth century to the Renaissance4. The goal is to remind the audience 
that Hobbes, Locke and the Enlightenment tradition only took over and did 
not invent the idea of  natural law and natural rights. But Moyn is also right 
when he points out that until the end of the 1930s, and especially during the 
nineteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church made a serious departure from 
this tradition and left the entire idea of  natural rights to the liberal tradition5.
Preparations for the renewal of this tradition occurred, however, in the 
early thirties with the emergence of the so-called personalist movement. This 
tradition is today most closely associated with the names of French thinkers 
Emmanuel Mounier and the aforementioned Maritain. But there is another 
significant name that should be mentioned. De Tavernier (2009) begins his 
narrative on the development of personalism until 1939 with the German pro-
fessor Rudolf Hermann Lotze, who through Rudolf Eucken made a major im-
pact on Max Scheler. Another of his students was Borden Parker Bowne, who 
is considered the founder of the American branch of personalism. Eucken vis-
ited Boston and New York in 1912–1913 as a visiting professor. His criticism of 
Protestant individualism is especially emphasized, against which one should 
affirm personality, which always implies a connection with the community.
But the most important name in this early development is the French phi-
losopher Charles Renouvier who in 1903 published a book called Personalism 
(Doctrine of Person). At the center of his philosophy is the conception of free-
dom that must be defended from the heteronomy imposed by the doctrines 
of social sciences. He pointed out that everyone sees the need to rebuild rela-
tionships between an individual and a society. But his central concern is still 
to preserve the individual from the excessive meddling of the state and social 
order in his freedom. In order to preserve this, it is necessary to reform both 
the institutions and the individual at the same time. He, like later personal-
ists, tries to discard any absolute, preserving the task of searching for justice 
and truth. Instead of looking for absolute perfection in this world, we should 
fight for even a little more justice, Renouvier argued.
Čulo in his work brings a very good overview of different personalistic tra-
ditions, introducing the significant influence of Russian thought, which is not 
always the case with historical reviews and reconstructions of personalism. 
4  Wolsterstorff 2011: 42. These are the books by Brian Tierney, Charles Reid, John 
Witte Junior and Richard Tuck, dealing with natural law, canonical law in the Middle 
Ages, the Calvinist perception of natural rights and theories of natural law in the Mid-
dle Ages. Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural Rights, Natural 
Law and Church Law 1150–1625, Scholars Press, Atlanata, 1997, Charles J. Reid, Power 
over the Body, Equality in the Family. Rights and Domestic Relations in Medieval Canon 
Law, Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 2004, John Witte, Jr, The Refor-
mation of Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2008, Richard Tuck, Natural Rights The-
ories. Their Origin and Development, Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
5  The change of attitudes towards the idea of European integration has had a similar 
evolution. Between the two wars the League of Nations was rejected as a Masonic proj-
ect, but after the Second World War, the Roman Catholic Church became one of the 
promoters of this process, along with Free-mason organizations like Bilderberg.
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He rightfully emphasizes the influence of Alexander Mark (Lipjansky), who 
was a direct connection with Mounier, as well as Berdjajev’s colossal figure, 
very influential in certain Western circles in the period between the two wars 
after his arrival in Paris in 1924. Let us add that in 1925 the renowned St. Ser-
gius Orthodox Theological Institute was founded in Paris and became an im-
portant base of theological and philosophical thought. Čulo (2018: 38) is well 
aware that, unlike the French and other traditions, they have never flirted with 
Marxism or demonstrated any understanding for such experiments.
In the early thirties (from 1932) Mourier published the rather influential 
magazine L’Esprit, which attracted the attention of important names like Ga-
briel Marcel, Denis de Rougemont and Maritain. The basic idea was the cri-
tique of bourgeois individualism, an idea in which the individual is extracted 
from all social relations, separated from God, the family, the community, and 
tied in to the materialistic system of values. Also rejecting communism as a 
variant of the same materialism, Mounier sought spiritual restoration and a 
system in which an individual, as God’s image, would be integrated and re-
turned to a system of communities that respect human dignity.6 He suggested 
returning to the point in which the Renaissance took the wrong path, and re-
storing Christian humanism that would free Europe from the mistakes of lib-
eral and secular individualism.
A similar search was pursued by the great German philosopher, Max Schel-
er, and Louis Jansen, a thinker from Leuven who in 1939 published the notable 
book Personne et société. Some of the less prominent names De Tavernier cites 
include Cardinal Mersie, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Heribert Doms, author 
of the Meaning of Marriage (1939).
The quest for the overcoming of bourgeois liberalism led the personalists 
in different directions, so Maritain claimed in 1947 that there was a group of 
movements essentially connected only by the fact that they build their sys-
tem around the idea of  a person. However, Mounier’s action aimed at restor-
ing communitarianism and rooting the individual into a wider framework, 
above all religion, had the most important role until the church’s leadership 
entered the game again. Moyn rightly points out that throughout this period, 
until 1942, neither Mounier nor Maritain referred to human rights but rather 
renewed the tradition of natural law and human dignity. Moreover, for Mou-
nier, individual rights – as claimed in the Personalist Manifesto – are only a 
reflection of the bourgeois worldview. They are the legacy of the tragic ideol-
ogy of 1789 (Moyn 2010: 89). During the twenties Maritain was a member of 
the French Action, and even in the 1930s, when, like a considerable number 
of Roman Catholic intellectuals, he started his transformation toward more 
6  Mounier, (1936), Chapter I, “Bourgeois and Individualistic Civilization”. See also 
the entry on personalism in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.
stanford.edu/entries/personalism/, as well as Raush’s comprehensive monograph on 
Mounier’s work in the period 1932–1950 (Rauch 1972). Also, De Tavernier 2009.
STUDIES AND ARTICLES │ 275
moderate positions, he still does not mention human rights (for example, in 
his book Integral Humanism of 1936).
Pope Pius XI, however, at the end of his pontificate felt the need to react to 
totalitarian movements which he clearly recognized as forces that systematical-
ly destroy human dignity and act against religion. In two encyclicals published 
in 1937, he began to use the discourse that had been developed in personalistic 
circles and reaffirmed the Thomistic idea of  natural law. First on March 14 the 
encyclical Mit Brennender Sorge was published, which concerned the persecu-
tion of the church and other victims in the Third Reich; merely five days later 
it was followed by the encyclical Divini redemptoris, On Atheist Communism. 
With this, the Pope condemned both types of totalitarianism. While the sec-
ond encyclical particularly emphasized the right to property as part of gen-
eral human rights, the first explicitly stated that “a man as a person (persona) 
possesses rights he holds from God and which any collectivity must protect 
against denial, suppression or neglect”.7
That same year, as Moyn notes in his book from 2015, the Irish revolution-
ary leader and President of Ireland Eamon de Valera, succeeded in integrating 
a personalistic view of the world into the constitution of this young republic, 
as well as a discourse on human rights. He incorporated it into the preamble, 
but also in the normative part of the text. The preamble formulation in an ex-
traordinary way reflects this original communitarian and personalist back-
ground of the idea of  human rights and human dignity.8
Although Pacelli as Secretary of State in the same year followed this di-
rection in his performances, after being elected pope, he made a reversal by 
opening various options for the church, including those that in some prob-
lematic systems had worked well with the government or even supported it. 
But in America, the personalistic direction and discourse of rights had already 
largely come to life, so Maritain, during his war emigration, strengthened his 
movement toward the discourse of individual rights and did a tremendous job 
to restore human rights as part of the Christian tradition (Moyn 2010: 94). For 
the first time in 1942, in his articles, and then in the book Natural Law and 
Human Rights (Maritain 1944), he stated that the renewal of the idea of  nat-
ural law implied a broad set of pre-existing human rights. In his Christmas 
speech of 1942, Pius XII spoke in terms of human dignity and human rights.
This Maritain’s discourse was clearly also addressed to those who had ac-
cepted the theory of fascism and Nazism as a lesser evil that might be useful 
in the fight against communism. Together with human rights, he again legiti-
mized democracy, rejecting discourses (including Mounier’s and his own earlier 
7  http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_
enc_14031937_mit-brennender-sorge.html
8  “... and seeking to promote the common good, with due observance of Prudence, 
Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual may be assured, 
true social order attained, the unity of our country restored, and concord established 
with other nations...”. See Constitution of Ireland, original text, https://en.wikisource.
org/wiki/Constitution_of_Ireland_(original_text)
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ones) that saw both concepts as elements of the Western world’s hypocrisy, 
capitalism and general degradation. With Pacelli’s famous Christmas speech 
of 1944, even formally from the head of the Church, democracy was accepted 
and supported, as well as human rights and the alliance with the victorious lib-
eral democracies of the West. Of course, the rights are accepted and defended 
from the Roman Catholic, personalistic and communitarian perspective, as a 
necessary element of the renewal of Christian societies. In the post-Second 
World War period, even Mounier briefly incorporated the discourse of indi-
vidual rights into his personalism, but then again began to attack Maritain for 
that, from an extreme leftist position.
Moyn shows how a new discourse spread among various personalists after 
the war. Discussions of crimes against humanity were introduced in Nurem-
berg (François de Menton, a student of Mounier’s, led the French prosecuting 
team). Maritain expanded his influence first to UNESCO, creating the phil-
osophical basis for the UN Declaration of Human Rights, then as the French 
ambassador to the Vatican, and finally as a professor at Princeton Universi-
ty. In addition to Maritain, a great contribution was made in 1948 by Charles 
Malik, a Christian and personalist from Lebanon, who shaped the essential 
identity of the text of the Declaration, clearly building on a Christian basis.9 At 
that time Malik served as the Secretary of the Commission on Human Rights 
and the President of the Economic and Social Council of the UN. With him, 
there was Rene Cassin, a French Jew with remarkable sympathies for Chris-
tian democracy.10
The personalist discourse also marked the period of the creation of the 
European Community, when mainly Christian-democratic parties led the re-
construction of their countries and at the same time created a united Europe-
an space11. Even the Belgian socialist Paul-Henri Spaak came from a branch of 
the personalist movement. Under this influence, the European Convention on 
Human Rights was also written, a Convention which once emerged as a sharp 
protest against the materialist civilization, and is now used to promote the he-
donistic aspects of contemporary global ideology. The same approach can be 
found in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany from 1949, where 
it can be seen that the Protestants also accepted the personalist discourse of 
dignity and rights. Moyn extensively demonstrates this phenomenon by pre-
senting the work of Gerhard Ritter, who also insisted that the entire complex 
9  See Carlson 2015.
10  The second part of this article offers a detailed overview of both of their contribu-
tions to the Universal Declaration. For Cassin see the recently published monograph 
Winter, Prost 2013.
11  Here Moyn rightly points to the works of Wolfram Kaiser, the most prominent 
contemporary historian of the Christian democratic movement and the role of Chris-
tian democracy in the creation of unified Europe after the war. But he also recalls the 
Italian and French contributions made by Papini and Philippe Chenaux respectively. 
See Moyn 2010: 100. Kaiser’s bibliography is included in the references at the end of 
this paper; the monograph Kaiser 2007 is particularly relevant here.
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can be meaningful only if it separates itself from abstract discourses of equality 
and from the atomistic heritage of the earlier mercantile civilization.
As Moyn concludes, in this period a fundamental transition from individual 
to person is seen, i.e. the individual as a dignified person of God deeply rooted 
in and bound up in divine natural law and customs and the moral norms of his 
(Christian) community. From the sixties onwards, however, a radical departure 
began, which resulted in the complete suppression and forgetting of this orig-
inal, communitarian, moral and Christian basis of human rights.
With these works Moyn almost went against the complete academic main-
stream and the intuition of the general public. He of course is aware of this, 
and himself cites competing narratives about the origins of human rights, 
such as Straus’’s famous book Natural Law and History.12 But his work is very 
well-founded and based not only on documents, but also on the very clear log-
ic of the post-war situation that we have forgotten today. Neothomism and 
the personalistic tradition of natural law were indisputably if not the only one 
then certainly one of the most important intellectual incentives for the birth 
of the modern human rights discourse and its codification in internationally 
accepted documents and agreements.
What seems to be the developed, subtle and almost scholastic philosophical 
basis of this discourse can be found in the fourth chapter of Maritain’s book 
Man and the State that discusses human rights.13 Although the author defends 
and advocates the pragmatic approach that prevailed during the adoption of 
the Universal Declaration, the most important contribution, in fact, is his in-
sistence on the fact that the natural law by which the rights are inspired is fully 
objectively and realistically taken (understood) in the best Thomist tradition, 
directly against any nominalistic, Occamian tradition from which pragmatism 
originates. He explains that for the purposes of adopting the Declaration for 
strategic reasons it was necessary to find the pragmatic minimum between the 
parts of mankind that belong to various religions, cultures and worldviews. So 
they all give up the need to impose their own interpretation and foundation of 
human rights in order to enumerate and accept a common minimum of rights 
that would be binding for everyone.  This, however, does not prevent him from 
saying in the next step that we need a clear understanding in the Western cul-
ture, but also (a metaphysical) explanation of the concept, and according to 
him, it has to be sought in the tradition of natural law, which must be renewed 
(Maritain 1951: 80, 85).
Maritain clearly defies Condorcet’s Enlightenment ideas of universal laws 
that can be copied from nature; he also rejects deism, and demands that the real 
theory of natural law be restored following the trail of Suarez and Vitoria. The 
fact that there is a natural law which a person can access and slowly reveal does 
12  One such criticism of Moyn for exaggeration is the extensive review of Professor 
John Witte Junior. See Witte Jr. 2016.
13  These are six lectures held in Chicago, published in English in 1951, and in French 
two years later. The book was translated into our language and published in 1992 in Za-
greb. See Maritain 1992. This article uses the original English edition, Maritain 1951.
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not mean that it can be transcribed, easily intelligently discovered and adopt-
ed. Moreover, Maritain argues that it is not seen by reason, but by inclination 
or intuition, and reason can only clarify, explain and develop this perception.
Natural law, he claims, is at the same time clearly ontological and ideal in 
nature (Ibid: 89). The main principles are, of course, published in the Deca-
logue, and their content is primarily moral. Every positive law can obtain its 
legitimacy only on the basis of this natural law. Values  for Maritain are clear, 
real in nature, and their foundation in natural law is metaphysical (Ibid: 96).
Of course, due to the limited human cognitive capacities, some flexibility in 
their interpretation, construction, gradual detection and development is nec-
essary. These rights are inalienable, but in a prima facie sense. Rights which 
are both substantially and absolutely inalienable in reality can be temporar-
ily alienated because, due to the potential damage that can stem from their 
unlimited exercise, states and societies must have the right to suspend them 
partially, postpone their realization, etc. This clearly shows the purely com-
munitarian foundation of the conception and the dependence of human rights 
on the state of the community. At the end of his text Maritain mentions three 
types of societies: liberal-individualistic, communist and personalistic, based 
on the natural law, which he advocates (Ibid: 106). So even though natural law 
is an unchangeable ontological law, it is also relative in terms of man’s aware-
ness of this law, so progress can be made in its acknowledgement. That’s why 
people are actually debating the extent of the law in practice.
Maritain attempts here to reconcile the old and new rights, with family 
rights being particularly important (he claims they are older than political and 
positive rights), as well as labor rights. He ultimately argues that international 
law draws its strength from the basis of natural law (despite the advocacy of the 
pragmatic foundation) and on page 100 lists basic human rights as he sees them.
*
Only the experience of brutality perpetrated in the Second World War, and 
especially by the Nazi regime, could have explained such a strong need of hu-
manity to return to the idea of  universal, divine natural law. The Enlightenment 
tradition in all its political forms believed that by secularizing the world, its 
disenchantment and by promoting the constructivist methodology and ideol-
ogy, on the basis of which man creates himself, his concepts, relations and the 
world, it will elevate human nature and stimulate the realization of the greatest 
possible technological and political achievements. However, it turned out that 
man, when deprived of his supernatural duties, fear and foundations and left 
to his own devices, deconstructed etc, showed the worst traits of his nature. 
Nazi death camps, eugenics and Mengele’s unimaginably brutal experiments 
on living people have shown that by depriving itself of the divine foundation, 
humankind quickly reverted to its animal nature deprived of dignity and sa-
cralization, thus enabling some to see other members of their kind as consum-
able, expendable cells, flesh and bones.
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That is why the terrible need was felt for the human being not only to be 
returned to dignity, but also to re-establish it in the tabooed area of the super-
natural, or Divine transcendent natural law. Christian personalism, which, as 
shown above, developed greatly in the 1930s and early 1940s, with its renewal 
of natural law and the return of the idea of  human rights since 1942, was the 
most satisfactory and the most convenient existing philosophical and meta-
physical framework for the development of the human rights culture after the 
Second World War. This worldview was imposed immediately after the for-
mation of the United Nations and UNESCO, and in 1946, a secretariat in the 
form of a commission of 18 members was formed with the idea of  compiling 
a global list of rights according to the model of the American Bill of Rights. 
This endeavor, as described below, ended with the adoption of the UNDHR.14
Of course, the Secretariat and the General Assembly, which adopted the 
declaration, were international institutions made up of representatives coming 
from different cultures, religions, countries and peoples. Hence, the discourse 
of the Declaration and the manner of explaining and defending its solutions 
needed to be acceptable to all. But as Malik explained later,15 in the spirit of 
Maritain’s approach, the personalists who led this process knew very well what 
they were doing, and in the end, through a certain kind of diplomacy and ne-
gotiations, succeeded in including most of their ideas in the document.
Eleanor Roosevelt, the wife of the recently deceased US President, was the 
chair of the Commission. She first led the US delegation in the first UN estab-
lishing meeting in London in January 1946. Immediately she had a conflict with 
the representative of the USSR Vyshinsky about the fate of millions of people 
who were displaced at the time, about former camp prisoners, etc. The issue 
of the right to asylum in the declaration would also become one of the numer-
ous points of contention between communist and non-communist countries.
The first session of the Commission itself was convened in January 1947 and 
it was decided that the draft be submitted by Roosevelt, Peng Chung Chang, 
the representative of China, and Charles Malik as the representative of Leba-
non. The Commission was slowly expanded to include 18 members. Rene Cas-
sin, the representative of France and John Humphrey, the Canadian delegate, 
would play a particularly important role. Charles Malik, born and educated in a 
Christian family in Lebanon, received a doctorate in philosophy from Harvard 
University. The most important intellectuals in the Commission were Malik, 
who based all of his arguments on the theory of natural law, and P.C. Chang, 
who at one point suggested that the Commission should take some time and, 
for example, familiarize itself with Confucianism, i.e. with the value and meta-
physical basis of the Chinese and other non-European cultures.
14  The narration is reconstructed according to the following works: Jacobson 2008, 
Habib 2000, Glendon 2001, Glendon 2011, Winter, Prost 2013, Čulo 2018, Muadri Dar-
raj 2010, and in particular Morsink 1999, which is so far the best overview of the whole 
drafting process with all of its conflicts, struggles and debates.
15  See Malik 1980. Disputes about the extent to which the Declaration is a product 
primarily of the Western tradition are still ongoing. 
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Malik, in contrast to the presidents who put emphasis on the economic and 
material needs of people, insisted on the intellectual and moral basis of human 
rights: “If we do not emphasize the true nature of man, his mind and spirit, pro-
tect them and promote, the fight for human rights will be a shame and irony.” 
René Cassin was a French Jew and judge who would receive the Nobel Peace 
Prize in 1968 for his efforts in the composing of the final draft of the UNDHR. 
During the war, the Germans had put a price on his head, and 29 members of 
his extended family were killed in concentration camps.
The first draft was made by John Humphrey and his associates. It was ac-
tually a list of some 48 areas, that is, the rights that needed to be regulated 
and pointed out. For every right there was a sub-commentary and explana-
tion, which all eventually covered the 400-page material. Humphrey started 
out from the traditions familiar to him: the Magna Carta, the Declaration of 
Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the French Declaration of the Rights 
of Man and the Citizen. The fact that this was the material that provided the 
starting ground for future debates and efforts just strengthens the arguments 
about the Western character of the Declaration.
Eleanor Roosevelt herself wanted to make some sort of Universal Bill of 
Rights, while others sought a document that would have a higher binding legal 
force. After numerous debates and Humphrey’s material, the task of writing 
the draft of the Declaration was entrusted to Cassin. He was at that time at the 
top of the French supreme court or the Conseil d’État and was a well-known 
jurist and philosopher, with great sympathy for the idea of  Christian democra-
cy. His draft was completed in June 1947, with the preamble, six introductory 
articles, and thirty-six normative ones divided into six parts, and two articles 
on their implementation. Among other things, there was a claim that would 
later be removed, insisting that there would be no peace in the world if human 
rights and freedoms were not respected.
In December 1947, the next meeting of the entire commission was held in 
Geneva. The Indian delegate Mehta asked that gender issues be discussed, and 
that instead of the Declaration of Human Rights they speak of the rights of 
persons or human beings; her suggestion was not adopted. After Geneva, the 
next meeting was scheduled for May 1948, and a smaller commission contin-
ued to work on the draft. However, Malik and Cassin had a serious disagree-
ment over the first Israeli-Arab war, which was just beginning. The Soviets also 
made a lot of problems, and Roosevelt accused them of trying to destroy the 
draft declaration altogether.
Malik revised the preamble and in June the draft was ready for the next in-
stance (ECOSOC, the Third Committee, and finally the General Assembly). 
There were many dilemmas and debates in the meantime: how will the dec-
laration and rights be implemented; would the declaration necessarily under-
mine the sovereignty of states; whether the rights were natural or obtained 
from God, etc. In the end, however, the committee decided to rename the 
document from the International to the Universal Declaration. The draft was 
adopted on December 7, and the Declaration was presented to the General 
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Assembly by Malik, who had already become a highly respected person. The 
declaration was adopted by 48 states, and 8 including the Soviet Union and 
Yugoslavia abstained from voting.
The idea of  dignity that appears in the preamble and in the famous first ar-
ticle (‘human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’), as well as 
its separation from the rights bears a deep personalist stamp. Today, especial-
ly due to the development of bioethics, there are intensified debates in which 
transhumanists, for example, insist on removing the idea of  some special dig-
nity of man (Rosen 2012: 120) and claim that the evolutionary list of rights is 
all that is needed. Precisely because of this kind of tendencies Malik and Cas-
sin insisted on the introduction of a special affirmation of dignity, as was also 
done in the German Basic Law.
The second basic concept of personalism is the idea of  a person, where, 
unlike individualism, it insists on the communitarian nature of man, as inte-
grally embedded within the community. Mary Ann Glendon aptly defines this 
model of understanding the human by commenting on Malik’s vision: “Ma-
lik saw man as uniquely valuable in himself, but as constituted in part by and 
through his relationships with others – his family, his community, his nation, 
and his God”. (Glendon 2000: 3)
Malik and Cassin, along with Maritain’s mediation, happen to be most re-
sponsible for two key personalist contributions, articles 16 and 18, which have 
been the subject of great struggles and harsh debates. Strongly opposed to 
these contributions were the Soviet participants, as well as some representa-
tives of the Western countries (Great Britain, for example), who included the 
“spirit of modernity” and whose ear, as Malik said, did not like the notions of 
nature, mind and conscience that the drafters fought for, in spite of pressures.
In his later speeches, Malik emphasized the importance of winning the fight 
for Article 16, which he proposed in several versions. The importance of this 
victory would become apparent some six decades later, when the Obama ad-
ministration on several occasions tried unsuccessfully to initiate the process of 
removing this article from the Declaration. What bothered them the most was 
the definition of family in paragraph 1, which defines marriage as the union 
of man and woman, and paragraph 3, which determines that the family is a 
natural and basic cell of society and that as such it has the right to protection 
from society and the state.
During the drafting of the text, British representatives and some US del-
egates argued that there was no need to emphasize the significance of the 
family, and that this article should be removed, as allegedly such rights were 
covered by the provisions of the right to association and social protection. In 
this way they sought to equate the family with political parties or joint stock 
companies. Cassin and Malik reacted together against this, and they succeed-
ed in securing the majority to eventually accept a somewhat more moderate 
formulation than the one in which Malik mentioned “A Creator as the one 
who endowed the family with inalienable rights that precede positive laws” 
(Morsink 1999: 254). Cassin very precisely clarified that these were two types 
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of philosophy, and that it is not good that the human being is mentioned only 
as an individual who chooses to get in touch with other people. In the end, 
the continental personalistic perception which insists on the communitarian 
nature of humans and sees the family as the most basic and most important 
community emerged victorious.
Malik made this clear by offering explanations coming from the classical 
Christian, that is, the Christian-democratic perspective of the importance of 
intermediary institutions. He first criticized the idea of  seeking rights only 
from the state, noting that family, church and other natural groups of people 
come before and independently of the state, and therefore their rights should 
be recognized as basic and inalienable, even in relation to the state. At the ses-
sion of the Commission held on January 1, 1947, Malik explained that we must 
defend man against the tyranny of the state, “... and the tyranny of systems, 
because man has other loyalties than his loyalty to the state. He has loyalty to 
his family, to his religion, to his profession; he has his loyalty to science and 
to truth. These loyalties are as exacting on him as his loyalty to the state. And, 
in my opinion, the fight for freedom today consists primarily in asserting the 
rights of these intermediate institutions.” (Malik 2000: 26, Jacobson 2008: 2) 
In a speech in February 1948, Malik said: “Where and when are we really free 
and humane? ... Is not it true that we enjoy the deepest and the most authen-
tic freedom and humanity in our family, in the Church, in the intimate circle 
of friends, when we are embedded in the joyful forms of our people’s lives, 
when we seek, find, see and accept the truth? These intermediary institutions 
between the state and the individual are the real source of our freedom and 
our rights.” (Malik 2000: 95, Jacobson 2008: 4)
Another extremely important communtarian article is Article 18 of the Dec-
laration, which is today severely under attack; a neglected but, as Matthew 
Jones remarked ten years ago, fundamentally important dictum. Unfortunate-
ly, he noticed, in the UN this right is not only one of the weakest developed 
over the decades, but is directly under attack due to anti-defamation laws, 
declarations, provisions, and the spread of allegedly anti-discrimination leg-
islation, which is reduced to discrimination of Christians and believers wher-
ever possible and also the deprivation of the rights to freedom of thought and 
conscience (Jones 2008). This article reads as follows: “Everyone has the right 
to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to 
change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with 
others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, 
practice, worship and observance.”16
Morsink explains that the entire spirit of the Declaration is based on the 
personalistic idea that communities, or intermediary institutions as Malik 
terms them, are “a cradle of human rights” because they teach people about 
the reciprocity of rights and duties (1999: 252). After the family, the other two 
most important institutions of this type are the religious community and the 
16 UNDHR, article 18, https://www.un.org/en/udhrbook/pdf/udhr_booklet_en_web.pdf
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educational institution which a child is attending. Therefore, together with the 
freedom of religion, this article also affirms the freedom of religious teaching 
and freedom to educate children in one’s own faith.
During the preparation of the Declaration, this article was a major point 
of contention. By the way, it should be noted that here too, any speech on mi-
nority rights was avoided, that is, there is no mention of the rights of religious 
minorities. As a result of Hitler’s abuse of the minority discourse and minority 
rights in the case of Czechoslovakia and Poland, the matter of minority rights 
is avoided throughout the text of the Declaration (Morsink 1999: 269–280).17
Some states were fundamentally bothered with this provision of the pos-
sibility of changing religion. Saudi Arabia was thus one of the eight countries 
that had abstained on December 10, 1948. However, these were not only Islam-
ic states, but also Sweden, which at that time had a state religion and a legal 
ban on abandoning the Lutheran denomination. Similar concerns were shared 
by Greece. On the other hand, some secular Western countries and the USSR 
demanded that no religious rights be mentioned or that the right to atheistic 
propaganda be recognized. But eventually a compromise was reached and so 
this article together with Article 2, provides an adequate combination of com-
munitarianism and pluralism when it comes to clearly defining the right to re-
ligion, its practice and transmission to children.
The communitarian and personalist nature of the text of the Declaration 
is also apparent in the first paragraph of the last article 29, which reads: “Ev-
eryone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full develop-
ment of his personality is possible.” And this position deeply stems from the 
so-called spirit of modernity of which Malik speaks as the main obstacle in the 
process of elaboration, and which today solely affirms the rights, and negates 
any idea of  obligation, duty and responsibility. That is why this final article is 
important: it reminds us that without the communitarian basis and the exist-
ing order of the community, there can be no other appropriate rights. So, in 
order to enjoy the rights, we must respect the obligations imposed on us by the 
community. Therefore, in his speeches before the General Assembly as well as 
later on, Malik insisted on the close bond between freedom and responsibility.
A great battle was also fought around the perception of the origin and source 
of human rights. Here is how at the end of his presentation of the Declaration 
on September 27 Malik presented this issue reflecting views of the majority 
of the Commission that had prepared the draft: “Finally, there is a question 
of their origin, where do they come from? Has it been given to me by any ex-
ternal visible power like the state or the UN so that what has now been grant-
ed to me can easily be confiscated? Or do they belong to my nature so that if 
they are violated in any way, I cease to be a human being at all? If they really 
17  Mazower 2004, devotes the entire first part of his article to the analysis of the pro-
cess in which from the promotion of minority rights after World War I, politicians came 
to the affirmation of universal human rights as a way to avoid dealing with minority 
rights at all.
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belong to my essence, then should not they also be founded in the Supreme 
Being who, being the Lord of history, could guarantee their meaning and sta-
bility?” (Malik 2000: 115, Jacobson 2008: 4)
*
The UN Declaration of Human Rights remained the most important monu-
ment to this personalistic, Christian foundation of human rights after the Sec-
ond World War. But since the 1960s, a complete change in the metaphysical, 
moral and content nature of this idea has begun. The evolution of human rights 
today has gone in the direction of completely opposing the aforementioned 
personalist sources. Western Christian denominations, however, continued to 
indefinitely defend the universality of human rights and natural law, although 
secularist, anti-Christian fundamentalism and very dangerous concepts are 
now often pushed under this guise.
Seven decades after the adoption of the UNDHR we live in a world of no 
less turbulence and fear. We have seen in this area that the very idea of  uni-
versal human rights can be instrumentalized and abused for political pur-
poses, just as Malik warned, appealing for responsible handling of this issue. 
But today’s atheist fundamentalism seems to be radically progressing and, as 
Scruton notes, the human rights religion is used as a cover for the advance-
ment of new totalitarianism and the suppression of the rights of traditional-
ists and people of faith, even though this directly violates Articles 16 and 18 
of the UNDHR. Or, let’s take a look at, for example, the third paragraph of 
Article 26, which states that “Parents have a primary right to choose a type of 
education for their children.” The draft of the Civic code in Serbia, however, 
directly violates this right by transferring it to children, claiming that a child, 
for example, can alone choose in which high school to enroll. In short, the en-
tire contemporary generation of rights that are now spoken of as the rights 
of the fourth generation directly goes against some of the basic postulates of 
the Universal Declaration, further confirming its personalistic and essentially 
Christian background and framework.
This presentation was an attempt to remind us of this suppressed and ob-
scured original spirit of the Declaration of Human Rights, as well as a call to 
wake it up and ensure that human rights again get a meaning and a respon-
sible implementation framework, rather than being instruments for the de-
struction of particular societies and the entire international order. It is worth 
recalling the following warning words of Malik: “The superficial folk mocked 
the classical ages of faith: today they pay the price of their unguarded super-
ficiality ... It is dangerous to ignore the mind and spirit of man and mock the 
logos.” (Malik 2000: 115)
Malik, a true Christian, saw the catastrophe of the Second World War as a 
logical outcome of human deviation from God, from the supernatural source 
of natural law and law, and therefore he did everything to stop this process 
and restore a framework that gives holiness and dignity to man as well. Today, 
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unfortunately, we live in a time that violates the divine frame and dignity of 
man, brings back paganism, eugenics and the possibility of playing with the 
human genetic code.
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Hrišćanski personalizam kao izvor Univerzalne deklaracije  
o ljudskim pravima
Apstrakt
Povodom 70. godišnjice usvajanja Univerzalne deklaracije o ljudskim pravima, autor je po-
kušao da analizira teorijski i istorijski okvir koji je doprineo usvajanju dokumenta. Prvi deo 
članka razmatra razvoj filozofije personalizma od Munijea do Maritena i analizira Maritenove 
poglede na ljudska prava. U drugom delu članka autor pokazuje odlučujući uticaj ličnosti 
Čarlsa Malika i Rene Kasana na usvajanje dokumenta, koji jasno nosi oznaku diskursa i poj-
mova hrišćanskog personalizma.
Ključne reči: personalizam, ljudska prava, Univerzalna deklaracija, hrišćanstvo, Mariten, 
Malik
